



Toward a More Effective Defense: The Final Report of the CSIS Defense Organization Project
by Philip A. Odeen

Review by: Andrew J. Pierre

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HAWKS, DOVES AND OWLS: AN AGENDA FOR AVOIDING NUCLEAR WAR. Edited by Graham T. Allison, Albert Carnesale and Joseph S. Nye, Jr. New York: Norton, 1985, 282 pp. \$14.95.

Who are owls? Unlike hawks who view weakness as a cause of war, or doves who see provocation as dangerous, owls are concerned about nonrational factors and loss of control. Nuclear war would not result from a deliberate act but from the unintended consequences of a crisis or conventional war. This lively volume builds upon the earlier Harvard book, *Living with Nuclear Weapons*. It includes a specific and eminently sensible list of "do's" and "don't's" covering many of today's principal arms control issues. The fresh approach to old problems should stimulate new—though not necessarily novel—thought.

NEGOTIATING FROM STRENGTH: LEVERAGE IN U.S.-SOVIET ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS. By Robert J. Einhorn. New York: Praeger/Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, 1985, 120 pp. \$9.95 (paper).

Not just another book on arms control, this study discusses the role of military weapons programs as instruments of leverage in negotiations. This approach has much merit, given the extent to which the debate on such weapons has hinged on their value as bargaining chips. Einhorn has many sensible comments regarding the impact of American defense programs on Soviet negotiating strategies and the way the U.S.S.R. sets its own priorities. His experience as an official of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency has clearly placed him in good stead in examining this complicated, and most important, topic.

HOW TO MAKE NUCLEAR WEAPONS OBSOLETE. By Robert Jastrow. Boston: Little, Brown, 1985, 176 pp. \$15.95.

Written by a scientist with strong credentials, this is perhaps the most complete argument available in favor of Star Wars outside of official publications. The jargon-free quick pace should attract a wide range of readers, while the skeptics will remain unpersuaded, in part by the debatable assertions which are to be found in the analysis. One such of particular importance is the claim that even a leaky nuclear umbrella or shield will enhance the credibility of U.S. retaliation.

TOWARD A MORE EFFECTIVE DEFENSE: THE FINAL REPORT OF THE CSIS DEFENSE ORGANIZATION PROJECT. Chairman, Philip A. Odeen. Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, 1985, 66 pp.

Of the many proposals for defense reform over the past two decades, this one deserves to be taken very seriously. The bipartisan Steering Committee of the Defense Organization Project of the CSIS consists of an outstanding group of former Department of Defense civilian leaders, retired military officers, members of Congress and academic experts. The proposed changes are moderate and realistic in political and bureaucratic terms, although they will no doubt meet resistance in some quarters. They have been endorsed as a package by six former secretaries of defense. Among the many recommendations: strengthening the position of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff vis-à-vis the JCS as a corporate entity in advising the president and the secretary of defense; expanding the role

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of the under secretary for defense policy; shifting the defense budget from an annual to a biennial cycle; greater prominence to programs for readiness and sustainability of forces in the field; emphasis on market incentives, in lieu of regulation, to reduce costs and improve the effectiveness of the weapons-acquisition process. With the consensus of the early 1980s on defense now broken, this pragmatic, nonpolemic report could provide the basis for a new start in revitalizing and reforming the defense establishment.

ARMS AND OIL: U.S. MILITARY STRATEGY AND THE PERSIAN GULF. By Thomas L. McNaugher. Washington: Brookings, 1985, 226 pp. \$26.95 (paper, \$9.95).

The appropriate role of military force, arms transfers, and diplomacy are carefully and broadly discussed in this excellent Brookings volume. Although focusing on American military strategy, McNaugher would encourage countries such as Jordan, Pakistan and Great Britain to continue their historical involvement in Gulf security. The American role, it is argued, should focus on protecting the oil-rich states from external threats and deterring Soviet encroachment. This requires greater "agility," i.e., improved airlift and sealift capabilities. Because it is not a cry of alarm for urgent action but a calm plea for marginal and feasible improvements, the author's recommendations are highly credible.

NATO'S FUTURE: TOWARD A NEW TRANSATLANTIC BARGAIN. By Stanley R. Sloan. Washington: National Defense University Press, 1985, 241 pp. \$6.50 (paper).

This is a carefully crafted, easily read, politically "mainstream" survey of the Atlantic alliance: past, present and future. As such it has much merit and should be on the reading list of what has come to be known as the "successor generation" to NATO's founders. The author, at the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress, has been knowledgeably tracking NATO's development for many years. The elements of continuity in the alliance are evident and well chronicled; the evolution which has occurred—greater than often acknowledged—is accurately noted; and as to the future, Sloan calls for a stronger European "pillar" within NATO to correct the mismatch between Europe's potential and current power.

FRANCE AND CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE IN CENTRAL EUROPE. By David S. Yost. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1985, 132 pp. \$16.50 (paper).

The usual focus on France's nuclear weapons has often served to divert attention from her conventional force posture. David Yost, in this tightly reasoned and documented book, has therefore performed an important service in clearly analyzing France's non-nuclear situation. Although certainly capable of making a more important contribution in central Europe, France, thinks Yost, is not likely to do so because improving conventional forces is viewed as harmful to the credibility of nuclear deterrence. He does an admirable job in pointing out the ambiguities in the French policy of "sanctuarization" and in his analysis of the new "Force d'Action Rapide."

THE SOURCES OF MILITARY DOCTRINE: FRANCE, BRITAIN AND GERMANY BETWEEN THE WORLD WARS. By Barry R. Posen. Ithaca (N.Y.): Cornell University Press, 1984, 283 pp. \$32.50.